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ABSTRACT
Chaos theory holds that systems act in unpredictable, nonlinear ways and that their behavior 
can only be observed, never predicted. This is an informative model for an organization in crisis. 
The West Virginia water contamination crisis, which began on January 9, 2014,  ts the criteria of a 
system in chaos. This study employs a close case study method to examine this case through the 
lens of chaos theory and its tenets: sensitivity to initial conditions, bifurcation, fractals, strange 
attractors, and self-organization. In particular, close attention is paid to emergent organizations 
and how their embodiment of strange attractor values spurred the self-organization process for 
this chaotic system.
KEYWORDS: Chaos theory; crisis communication; water contamination; West Virginia water 
crisis
Crises, regardless of the form they take, present unique and challenging 
circumstances for those aff ected to overcome. Be they natural disasters 
or organizational crises, they are defi ned by three characteristics that 
set them apart from other nonroutine events: threat, surprise, and a 
short response time (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003). An environmen-
tal disaster in the form of a leak, spill, or contamination meets these 
requirements because there is little to no warning before it happens, 
aff ected stakeholders are not expecting this departure from the norm, 
and there is the added pressure of not only stopping the leak/spill but 
also dealing with the contaminated area quickly to avoid exposure 
to large numbers. The Bhopal disaster, BP Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill, and Exxon Valdez oil spill are examples of previous accidental 
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contamination events studied from a crisis communication perspec-
tive. A crisis in this form poses unique challenges, and those are only 
compounded if the contamination affects the local food and/or water 
supply. In addition to cleaning up the initial contamination, there are 
also concerns about the long-term effects on the environment and on 
those individuals exposed to the contaminant.
In January 2014, Charleston, West Virginia, experienced its envi-
ronmental crisis in the form of a chemical spill that contaminated the 
water supply and left 300,000 residents unable to do anything but flush 
their toilets with the water in their homes. This water use ban lasted 
approximately 2 weeks and required people to find alternate sources 
for drinking water and ways to perform basic functions like bathing, 
brushing their teeth, washing dishes and clothes, and providing water 
for their pets. The organizations that should have provided pertinent 
messages for self-protection failed to do so in a timely and clear man-
ner, leaving affected stakeholders confused and unsure of how best to 
protect themselves and loved ones. The bulk of the crisis communica-
tion tasks were taken up by small emergent organizations formed by 
concerned and frustrated citizens. This unique circumstance, combined 
with the magnitude of the event (it was the largest drinking water con-
tamination in U.S. history at that time), makes the West Virginia case 
ideal to study from a risk and crisis communication perspective. More 
specifically, this case is examined through the lense of chaos theory 
because its description of an unpredictable system and its tenets are 
an insightful metaphor to apply to crisis events, which are nonlinear 
and the complexity of which appears unpredictable (Tsoukas, 2005).
Chaos theory has long been used by scientists and mathematicians 
to describe the systems and phenomena they observe. Chaos theory, 
stated simply, holds that systems act in nonlinear, unpredictable ways. 
The behavior they exhibit is dependent on the conditions surrounding 
them, and this behavior can only be observed and described, never 
predicted (Murphy, 1996). This makes sense when describing com-
plex weather patterns, ecosystems, and difficult mathematical models, 
hence why chaos theory is widely used by researchers in those fields. 
However, as of late, it has come to the attention of social scientist re-
searchers that chaos theory is a good model for describing the systems 
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they study. Human systems act in just as unpredictable ways as other 
systems. More specifically, crisis communication researchers see that 
chaos theory is an excellent model for describing an organization in 
crisis. The tenets of chaos theory—sensitivity to initial conditions, 
bifurcation, fractals, strange attractors, and self-organization—can 
all be observed throughout the life cycle of a crisis. Thus crisis com-
munication researchers have created a body of literature that applies 
chaos theory to crisis events (Freimuth, 2006; Horsley, 2014; Liska, 
Petrun, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2012; Murphy, 1996; Seeger, 2002; Sellnow, 
Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002). Though chaos theory did not originate in the 
social sciences, communication scholars see the heuristic value in the 
application of a scientific perspective to human systems (Berger & 
Chaffee, 1987). The nature of the West Virginia water contamination 
makes it a unique case to observe through the lens of chaos theory. This 
study pursues two related research questions. First, to what extent were 
the tenets of chaos theory observable during this crisis? Second, how 
does a case with such a broad and lasting impact further advance our 
understanding of crisis communication in chaotic circumstances? The 
remainder of this article provides a review of literature, a summary of 
the case, description of methods, and analysis of the case and ends with 
a discussion of implications and conclusions that can be drawn from 
this study.
Chaos and Crisis Communications
Chaos Theory
Chaos theory has its origins in the math and science disciplines. One 
of its first uses was by the scientist Edward Lorenz, who used it to map 
and explain complex weather patterns and systems. The main tenet of 
chaos theory is that systems act in nonlinear and unpredictable ways. 
Because of their inherent random behavior, it is impossible to accurately 
predict the behavior of a chaotic system. Perhaps the best-known tenet 
of chaos theory is the system’s sensitivity to initial conditions, which 
is often referred to as the butterfly effect. Put simply, this supposition 
implies that something as small and seemingly insignificant as the 
flapping of a butterfly’s wings can have a much greater impact and can 
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start a chain of events that leads to a large-scale event, such as a tidal 
wave that devastates a coastal area.
This theory fits well when describing complex systems like the 
weather, biological systems, and complex mathematical models, but as 
of late, social scientist researchers are seeing the applicability of chaos 
theory and the idea of unpredictable behavior to the systems they 
study. As Murphy (1996) stated, “chaos theory attempts to understand 
the behavior of systems that do not unfold in a linearly, predictable, 
conventional, cause-and-effect manner over time” (p. 96). Murphy 
wrote her seminal piece, published in the Journal of Public Relations, 
and showed the clear connections between the tenets of chaos theory 
and the systems often studied by social scientists and made a call for 
researchers to extend this body of literature and use chaos theory in 
their future research. Seeger (2002) echoed her sentiments in a follow-
up piece published in the same journal. He argued that organizations 
experiencing a crisis are an ideal model of a chaotic system and said 
the field of risk and crisis communication was ideal for the application 
of this theory. He pointed to each element of chaos theory—fractals, 
bifurcation, strange attractors, and self-organization—and showed 
how an organizational crisis contained each element across the crisis 
life cycle. Herein, each of these components will be defined, explained, 
and expanded—particularly in regard to strange attractors and self-
organization. Finally, chaos theory is applied to the 2014 West Virginia 
water contamination as an example of an ideal case that clearly exhibited 
all tenets of a system in chaos.
Fractals. Mandlebrot (as cited in Murphy, 1996) defined fractals as 
self-similar and repeating mathematical patterns. He often explained 
the intricacy of fractals by asking his students to measure the coast of 
Britain in various quantitative measures. When the coast was measured 
in miles, there was a different measure than when done in feet, inches, 
centimeters, grains of sand, and so on. This example demonstrated 
the problem with using quantitative units of measurement. Rather, 
Mandlebrot (as cited in Murphy, 1996) suggested fractals as a qualitative 
measurement that can describe “the relative degree of complexity of an 
object” (p. 100). Murphy also addressed the importance of considering 
scope and scale and said that
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the difficulty of perceiving pattern in chaos relates to the scale at which 
one views a phenomenon. . . . Chaos theorists note significant differ-
ences in the very structure and dimensionality of an object depending 
on the observer’s standpoint and measuring tools. (p. 98)
Thus the object can look very different depending on the standpoint of 
the individual. Horsley (2014) described fractals as changing with each 
successive iteration, but the evolution of the pattern from beginning to 
end can be observed when looking at the whole picture. In her exami-
nation of the Washington, D.C., sniper attacks, she said that at first it 
was difficult to determine a fractal pattern among the sniper victims 
because they were of different genders, ages, races, and so on, and the 
killings happened at random times and in different places. However, 
by observing the fractal sets from the point of view of the sniper who 
was targeting his wife (who had a restraining order against him), it 
became clear that he was targeting places like shopping malls and craft 
stores, where he thought she would be, thus revealing the pattern to 
his attacks (Horsley, 2014).
Sellnow, Seeger, and Ulmer (2002) noted the key difficulty with 
fractals by observing their role in the case of the historic Red River 
floods that affected residents in North Dakota and Minnesota. Ac-
cording to them, the problem was “the communication of excessive 
confidence in a measurement system that lacked the precision needed” 
(p. 276). In this case, they referred to the imprecise measurement 
tools and system that had been previously used to estimate flood lev-
els but in this case did not account for the sensitivity to initial con-
ditions, such as ice blockages, that had rendered the measurement 
system imprecise and irrelevant. However, because all the predic-
tions had shown that flooding would be at a certain level, this was 
communicated with confidence by meteorologists and a number of 
other officials. Because of this, the area was wholly unprepared to 
deal with the record-setting flood levels, exacerbating the chaos and 
representing a failure of viewing a fractal pattern from the wrong per-
spective. These examples demonstrate the complexity of fractals and 
the potential consequences of viewing the system from an incorrect 
perspective.
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Bifurcation. According to Freimuth (2006), “bifurcation is associ-
ated with a collapse of sensemaking. At these points, observers realize 
that the routine ways of operating have collapsed” (p. 145). These are 
points at which the system deviates from the established path and rou-
tine operations. In relation to the crisis life cycle, bifurcation could be 
considered the beginning or initial phases of the crisis and the point 
at which the system begins to act in a chaotic, unpredictable way. As 
Seeger (2002) stated, “organizational crises are points of system bifur-
cation or radical change where a system’s direction, character, and/
or structure is fundamentally disrupted or departs from the previous 
path” (p. 332). In some cases, this collapse in sense making can result 
in what Weick (1993) referred to as a cosmology episode. A cosmology 
episode is one in which people feel that “I’ve never been here before, I 
have no idea where I am, and I have no idea who can help me” (p. 634). 
In some instances, people and organizations respond to bifurcation by 
sticking with routine procedures or what has worked in the past, but 
as history and the literature have shown, for a system to pull itself out 
of bifurcation/chaos, it must acknowledge that the current conditions 
are new and unfamiliar and that the old ways of operating and func-
tioning must be abandoned before the system can begin the process 
of self-organization. As Venette, Sellnow, and Lang (2003) contended, 
“crisis is a process of transformation in which the old system can no 
longer be maintained” (p. 224). Thus bifurcation is marked by the 
system deviating from normal operations and a failure of previously 
effective interventions to get the system back on track. This was true 
of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) after it experienced a disas-
ter in the form of a coal ash spill that rained down tons of coal ash on 
the town of Kingston, Tennessee, destroying many homes, displacing 
many residents, and creating a sense of chaos for the affected area. 
In hindsight, CEO Tom Kilgore and others at the TVA were able to 
recognize six points of bifurcation that took them off the established 
path and eventually led to the spill (Liska et al., 2012). Most of these 
bifurcation points dealt with information siloes and a lack of com-
munication between departments within the organization. Because 
they were able to recognize how these bifurcation points put them on 
the path to disaster, the organization went through a self-organization 
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process and established new procedures and practices that would (it 
hoped) prevent the same thing from happening in the future (Liska 
et al., 2012). Bifurcation points mark the system’s departure from the 
norm and the beginnings of chaos. It is important to recognize these 
points and to remember that bifurcation, though highly disruptive to 
the system, is temporary.
Strange attractors. Strange attractors are
the fundamental points of connection and order, or lines of force and 
influence that exert a continual regulation on the form and behavior 
of a system regardless of the specific conditions. They are the points 
to which a complex system naturally and continually returns. (Seeger, 
2002, p. 334)
Strange attractors are elements that help a system in chaos begin the 
process of self-organization and start to emerge from bifurcation. Seeger 
said that attractors can take many forms, including family, community, 
and economic ties that lead to rebuilding after a disaster. As Freimuth 
(2006) said, “an attractor is an organizing principle such as a common 
set of values to which a system will return even as it moves through 
bifurcation” (p. 145). In this sense, strange attractors are those things 
present in the chaotic system that help it find a new order and begin 
the process of self-organization. It is because of strange attractors that 
a chaotic system begins to move away from bifurcation. Murphy (1996) 
referred to attractors as “an inherent shape or state of affairs to which 
a phenomenon will always tend to return as it evolves, no matter how 
random each single moment may seem” (p. 98). Thus organizations 
that experience a crisis that throws them into chaos and bifurcation 
should seek out those strange attractors that can help them begin self-
organization and moving out of chaos.
Sellnow et al. (2002) described the presence of the National Guard 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after the 
historic Red River floods as embodying the organizing principles that 
helped citizens begin to move from bifurcation to self-organization. 
As they described it, the presence of these two organizations gave 
the confused, disoriented citizens something/someone to look to as 
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they began the recovery and rebuilding phase (Sellnow et al., 2002). 
Horsley (2014) pointed to a similar strange attractor in her analysis of 
the chaos surrounding the D.C.-area sniper attacks. She claimed that 
the police chief at the helm of the case, Chief Moose, “personified the 
investigation and became a strange attractor” (p. 310). He embodied 
the principles of a strange attractor, as he was the one leading the case, 
handling the press conferences and media interactions, and using his 
position of authority to speak directly to the suspects. His presence was 
reassuring and helped give the community a sense that things would 
eventually return to normal (Horsley, 2014).
Strange attractors are present before the crisis and will exist after 
the crisis. That is why all chaotic systems eventually emerge from bi-
furcation. However, applying this concept metaphorically to a human 
system in crisis allows those strange attractors to manifest in different 
forms and be embodied by different individuals or groups. They help a 
system begin the process of moving from bifurcation and a cosmology 
episode into the process of self-organization that eventually pulls the 
system out of chaos. The system that emerges often looks and functions 
differently than it did prior to bifurcation because of the changes that 
the system underwent during the chaos and self-organization periods, 
which will be described later.
Self-organization. Self-organization is often referred to as the “anti-
chaos” mechanism. In the crisis life cycle, this is the point at which 
the recovery and renewal phases begin as the system moves away 
from chaos/bifurcation and toward stability. Seeger (2002) defined 
self-organization as “a natural process whereby order re-emerges out 
of the chaotic state brought on through bifurcation. This reorder-
ing process is sometimes characterized as the antithesis of chaos and 
as the outgrowth or consequence of bifurcation” (p. 332). Wheatley 
(2006) described the nature of self-organizing systems as adept and 
said that “self-organizing systems are never passive, hapless victims 
forced to react to their environments. . . . [The system] uses available 
resources more effectively, sustaining and strengthening itself ” (p. 83). 
Vicki Freimuth was at the helm of the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) when the 2001 anthrax attacks occurred, and she 
described the self-organizing process that the organization had to go 
through to handle such an unprecedented event. Though the CDC 
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handles disease outbreaks and epidemics regularly, never had such 
an instance (what many felt was the first major instance of bioterror-
ism on American soil) occurred that required such a large response. 
Freimuth (2006) described how every part of the CDC communication 
branch underwent a change—from the way calls from the public were 
received and handled to the way media requests and statements were 
handled. In some instances, entire new teams/organizations/structures 
needed to be assembled to handle tasks never before handled by the 
organization. These emergent structures were created in response 
to meet these new needs. As she stated, “the other new structures 
created were not modifications of previous ones but were new and 
filled gaps made apparent during the anthrax crisis . . . new structures 
emerging out of the chaos” (p. 146). Self-organization often results in 
the emergence of new structures and organizational policies. Horsley 
(2014) also saw this in her analysis of the D.C. sniper shootings. She 
described new behaviors, such as citizens standing between car doors 
as they pumped gas, schools going into lockdown mode, and people 
cancelling extracurricular activities and avoiding going outside unless 
absolutely necessary. These behaviors emerged in response to the unique 
situation.
For a system experiencing bifurcation to survive, it must go through 
the process of self-organization. If this does not occur, the system will 
succumb to chaos. To avoid this and reap the benefits of self-organi-
zation requires effort; otherwise, the system will dissolve. The nature 
of this process is largely dependent on the nature and type of strange 
attractors present in the system. When the system partners with its en-
vironment, it will develop new capacities that make it more resourceful 
and allow it to seek out a new form as a response to the environmental 
changes (Wheatley, 2006). Regardless of the nature, self-organization 
must occur to get the system back on track. As Wheatley stated,
the viability and resiliency of self-organizing systems comes from its 
great capacity to adapt as needed. . . . Neither form nor function alone 
dictates how the system is organized. Instead they are process structures, 
reorganizing into different forms in order to maintain their identity. . . . 
It is capable of organizing into whatever form it determines best suits 
the present situation. (p. 82)
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Chaotic systems do not remain in chaos forever because of the process 
of self-organization and the presence of strange attractors. In other 
words, these systems can be self-healing. Self-organization is not in-
herent in chaotic systems, however, and sometimes strange attractors 
fail to produce the necessary conditions for self-organization to occur. 
These concepts are closely related, and they are the reasons why orga-
nizations emerge from bifurcation, often looking very different than 
they did before the chaos began.
Case Summary
On January 9, 2014, residents of Charleston, West Virginia, and the 
surrounding counties began noticing an unusual smell in the air and 
in their homes, particularly when the water was running. The first 
formal complaint to this effect was registered with the Department of 
Environmental Protection (DEP) at 8:15 am; however, the West Vir-
ginia American Water Company was not made aware of the situation 
until noon and, at that time, was under the impression that the water 
treatment facility’s carbon filtration system would be able to handle the 
problem. However, it soon became apparent that the contamination 
exceeded the system’s capabilities, and at 5:45 pm, a full 9.5 hours after 
the first complaint was registered with the DEP, a “do not use” ban was 
issued to 300,000 customers (Ward & Gutman, 2014).
The source of the contamination was the Freedom Industries plant, 
which is located on the banks of the Elk River. This company stores 
chemicals for use in the mining, cement, and steel industries. Workers 
at the plant noticed a leak coming from a 1-inch hole in a tank that 
contained the chemical 4-methylcyclohexylmethanol (MCHM). This 
is a chemical used in the coal-cleaning process to remove grit and dirt 
from the outside of coal. Employees reported first noticing the leak 
at 10:30 am; they reported taking all the appropriate steps to stop the 
leak and clean up the damage to the best of their abilities (Ward, 2014). 
However, there was nothing to be done about the 7,500 gallons that had 
already leaked into the Elk River.
The “do not use” ban instructed the 300,000 affected residents 
not to drink, bathe, cook with, or wash with the water. Although this 
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information was pertinent for self-protection, because of the almost 
10-hour span between the beginning of the contamination and the is-
suing of the ban, 122 residents had already sought treatment for nausea, 
vomiting, and/or diarrhea, which are common symptoms of exposure 
to MCHM. By January 14, nearly 700 people had contacted the poison 
control hotline reporting symptoms including nausea and rashes, and 
14 people were hospitalized (Heyman & Fitzsimmons, 2014).
Authorities began lifting the ban on January 13; however, shortly after 
the initial announcement, officials quickly amended the statement based 
on recommendations from the CDC to exclude pregnant women and 
the immune compromised “out of an abundance of caution” (T. Frieden, 
personal communication, January 15, 2014). Before resuming normal 
water use, residents were informed that they first needed to flush their 
pipes to ensure that all the contaminated water had been cleared out 
of their systems (Plummer, 2014). This is where the confusion began, 
as clear, explicit instruction on how to properly flush one’s pipes was 
not given. For example, how long should the water run? Should I open 
my doors and windows while doing this? What about external spigots? 
It was also imperative that the residents shut off their hot water heat-
ers before beginning this process, but this instruction was not always 
explicit (Whelton et al., 2015). Thus, when people ran their hot water 
taps, the MCHM was transformed into a noxious gas that filled people’s 
homes, causing headaches, nausea, and nosebleeds. The ambiguity 
of the information given only served to heighten uncertainty among 
the affected population, precisely the opposite of the intended goal of 
emergency/crisis communicators.
Despite the fact that the ban was lifted and all federal aid in the form 
of bottled and potable water deliveries had ceased, 6 weeks postcontami-
nation, many residents still refused to drink or use the water in their 
homes. When they attempted to resume regular use, the odd smell and 
funny taste remained, continuing the distrust in the safety of the water 
(Goldenberg, 2014). Besides the obvious frustrations of having to use 
bottled water for consumption and for all basic household functions, 
West Virginians also faced the added challenge of finding the bottled 
water on their own. Most grocery stores and supermarkets could not 
keep shelves stocked with water, further complicating matters.
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On July 3, 2014, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) leveled fines against Freedom Industries that totaled $11,000. 
The company was fined $7,000 for not having a liquid-tight wall sur-
rounding its tanks and $4,000 for not having standard railings on an 
elevated platform (Boucher, 2014). On February 17, 2016, Freedom 
Industries’s president, Gary Southern, was sentenced to 30 days in jail 
and was ordered to pay a $20,000 fine for his negligence and role in 
the Elk River spill. Four other Freedom Industries officials received 
probation-only sentences (Ward, 2016a).
Method
Because of the time and attention paid by the researcher, this study 
qualifies as a robust and in-depth case study of an event. According to 
Yin (2013), a case study approach is most appropriate when three con-
ditions are met: the main research questions are “how” and “why,” the 
researcher has little to no control over behavioral events, and the focus 
of the study is a contemporary rather than a historical phenomenon. 
Others who have applied chaos theory to crises have employed this 
interpretive method as well (Horsley, 2014; Liska et al., 2012; Sellnow 
et al., 2002).
This was a public crisis that elicited a response from organizations 
at the local, state, and federal levels. From the outset, there was a large 
amount of uncertainty surrounding the case. Though the spill and 
subsequent water ban only lasted approximately 2 weeks, the conse-
quences of the event were felt for more than 2 years. Because of its 
impact, the event garnered national news coverage, in addition to the 
large amount of social media activity surrounding it, creating a large 
body of data for exploration. These characteristics, combined with the 
observable behavior of individuals and groups in response to this event, 
make it optimal for study from a social science case study perspective. 
According to Yin (2013),
whatever the field of interest, the distinctive need for case study arises 
out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena. . . . A case 
study allows investigators to focus on a “case” and retain a holistic and 
real-world perspective. (p. 4)
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Tracking of this event began the week after the spill happened and 
has continued for the 3 years following. The case was tracked by observ-
ing the traditional media and new media for updates about the unfold ing 
event. This case differed from other cases in which chaos theory has 
been applied because the established organizations were either absent 
from the crisis response or failed to provide useful information and 
pertinent messages for self-protection in a timely manner. Thus affected 
citizens turned to other sources for information. These sources took 
the form of emergent organizations using social media. To identify 
emergent organizations, the following definition was employed: an 
organization that did not exist prior to the contamination of the Elk 
River on January 9, 2014, but was formed in response to that event and 
used some form of information communication technology to carry 
out the majority of its functions. Using this definition, the tracking 
process revealed five emergent organizations: three Facebook pages, 
a blog, and a Twitter account. The content posted to these sites was 
closely tracked in addition to coverage of the spill in traditional media. 
These two sources provided ample data for constructing a rich case 
description, which Yin (2013) described as an “analysis organized on the 
basis of description of the general characteristics and relations of the 
phenomenon in question” (p. 5). Tracking of this case was undertaken 
with the goal of understanding the complex interactions surrounding 
this spill and its implications for those affected.
Analysis
Chaos theory holds that systems act in nonlinear and unpredictable 
ways (Murphy, 1996). Chaos theory comprises several components: 
sensitivity to initial conditions, bifurcation, fractals, strange attractors, 
and self-organization. Each of these plays a part in the life cycle of a 
system in chaos. As has been established, an organization experienc-
ing a crisis is an excellent fit for the metaphorical application of chaos 
theory (Seeger, 2002). The West Virginia water crisis is no exception. 
There are unique facets of this incident that align clearly with the tenets 
of chaos theory and demonstrate how this system experienced several 
points of bifurcation and descended into chaos before strange attractors 
appeared and spurred the process of self-organization and anti-chaos.
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Sensitivity to Initial Conditions
Because of a system’s sensitivity to initial conditions (i.e., the butterfly 
effect), simple things that might seem insignificant (like the flapping 
of a butterfly’s wings) can have a much larger impact on the system 
(Murphy, 1996). For example, in the West Virginia crisis, the hole that 
developed in the bottom of the tank was not due to corrosion from 
the chemical it held but rather from rainwater that entered through 
the top of the tank. According to Chemical Safety Board inspectors, 
“corrosion from water pooling inside the leaky tank likely caused the 
holes. The substances traveled through soil, gravel and water systems 
under the Freedom site before hitting the Elk River” (Mattise, 2014). 
Thus two commonplace natural phenomena (rainwater and freezing 
temperatures) set off a chain of events that resulted in the largest drink-
ing water contamination in American history at that time.
The proximity of the plant to the Elk River, Freedom Industries’s 
lax attitude toward safety, the absence of a proper plant safety inspec-
tion in more than 20 years, the unfortunate trajectory of the chemical 
flowing toward the river, and the use of the river as a drinking water 
source all combined to create a complex system with a greater potential 
for bifurcation. Systems/organizations with higher levels of complexity 
are more susceptible to instability and are more likely to experience 
crises (Seeger, 2002). This is precisely what happened to the complex 
system in West Virginia.
Bifurcation
Bifurcations are the points at which the larger system begins to devi-
ate from the norm and head down another path (Murphy, 1996). It is 
at these points that the system begins its descent into chaos. In West 
Virginia, there are several points of bifurcation to note. The point at 
which the hole developed in the bottom of the storage tank marks 
the beginning of the problems. Obviously, these tanks are meant to 
contain the chemicals, so the failure to do so marks a departure from 
the norm. When the DEP officials arrived at the scene, they described 
what they saw at tank 396:
They found a 400-square-foot pool of chemical that had leaked from 
the tank into a block containment area. Pressure from the material leak-
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ing out of the tank created what DEP officials called an “up-swelling,” 
or an artesian well, like a fountain of chemical coming up from the 
pool. (Ward, 2014)
Because of the dike failure, the chemical flowed freely into the Elk 
River, and “they saw a 4-foot-wide stream of chemicals heading for 
the containment area’s wall, and disappearing into the joint between 
the dike’s wall and floor” (Ward, 2014). At this point, several changes 
in the direction and structure of the system resulted in bifurcation and 
a departure from standard operating procedures. The chaotic system 
grew when the West Virginia American Water Company decided to 
issue the “do not use” order to 300,000 of its customers. The failures at 
the Freedom Industries site combined with the contamination of the 
Elk River and with it the drinking water supply for a major city created 
a chaotic environment and marked the point of bifurcation.
The issuing of the “do not use” ban also marks a cosmology episode 
for the affected residents. Cosmology episodes are a condition spurred 
by bifurcation. They occur when a person is in uncharted territory, 
does not know how to respond to this unknown situation, and does 
not know where to seek help. Weick (1993) described these incidents 
as a collapse in sense making and noted that individuals typically make 
sense of events by comparing them to past events. However, crises are 
unique events that often do not bear much resemblance to prior events. 
Instead of feeling déjà vu (I feel like I have been here before), a cosmol-
ogy episode causes feelings of vu jade (I have never been here before). 
For the 300,000 residents, it is highly unlikely that many (if any) had 
experienced a water ban like this before. One West Virginia resident, 
identified only as Sarah, said, “In all my 25 years of life this is the first 
time I have ever had to deal with something like this” (Bryson, 2014). 
Another affected resident, Nate Halstead, was quoted in a Washington 
Post article: “I drank a 32-ounce glass of it right before they put it on 
TV . . . I don’t know what to do, honestly” (Achenbach, 2014). Boil 
water advisories are more common and are easier to contend with 
than a complete and total inability to use the water in the home for 
any purpose other than flushing the toilet. Thus this was likely a new 
and unsettling situation the stakeholders found themselves in and one 
that caused great uncertainty and left them with few options of where 
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to turn for answers. In addition to affected residents, those involved 
in the response were also blindsided because “there was no testing 
method immediately available to determine how much MCHM was 
in the water, and no limit set by any regulatory agency or public health 
official for how much of the material was dangerous” (Ward, 2016b). 
This was unfamiliar territory and complicated the response efforts, as 
decision makers had no previous experience to guide them and were 
unsure where to begin.
Approximately 10 days after it had been introduced, officials began 
lifting the “do not use” ban. Affected residents were told it was safe 
to resume normal water use as long as they flushed their pipes for a 
certain amount of time to ensure the stagnant contaminated water was 
cleaned out of the system. People followed the instructions that were 
given by the established organizations. However, even after flushing, 
they found that their water still had a funny smell and odd taste. This 
instance of a prescribed intervention failing to yield the desired results 
represents another bifurcation point. Because the odd smell and taste 
lingered, many people chose to continue using bottled water and did 
not resume normal use of their tap water as the established organiza-
tions had expected them to do. Resident Melanie Kipp said,
Even after flushing, the water continued to smell like MCHM and 
whatever other chemicals were in the mix. It left an oily film on dishes 
and the skin. We continued to avoid it. Showering resumed, but they 
were quick and followed with a final rinse of heated bottled water. 
(Gerken, 2015)
These signs were obvious to stakeholders and were clear indicators that 
problems persisted, despite reassurances from established organiza-
tions. What was meant to be the point at which things began to return 
to normal actually became a point at which things continued in chaos.
Fractals
A third component of chaos theory is the idea of fractals. Fractals are 
concerned with the measurement of systems and are the larger observ-
able patterns within the overall system (Murphy, 1996). Fractals are 
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sometimes difficult to observe and are largely dependent on perception. 
When the DEP alerted the West Virginia American Water Company 
to this chemical contamination around noon, it was initially
working under the assumption that it was a flocculent, common in 
water treatment. Officials there did not learn the correct identity of the 
chemical until two hours later. . . . The company’s standard and emer-
gency water treatments are applicable to chemicals commonly found in 
water and were not effective on the chemical that leaked. (Ward, 2014)
Because these decisions were based on a pattern and measurement that 
only applies in normal operating conditions, they did not recognize 
the abnormal conditions created by a system experiencing bifurcation. 
Relying on standard operating procedures is largely ineffective in a 
chaotic system. It was not until several hours later, after observing the 
failure of the filtration system to operate effectively in these abnormal 
conditions, that the company recognized its error in judgment and is-
sued the “do not use” ban. Unfortunately, the amount of time that had 
elapsed before people were warned meant a greater number of people 
were exposed to this chemical.
A second example of reliance on an imprecise measure revolves 
around the creation of an acceptable threshold for MCHM in drink-
ing water. No such threshold existed prior to this event; thus the CDC 
and several other organizations worked together to quickly come up 
with a recommendation for an acceptable level of MCHM in drinking 
water. The original recommendation the team gave was one part per 
million (Ward, 2014). However, after publicly announcing that as an 
appropriate level, they had to quickly amend that statement to exclude 
pregnant women, infants, and the immune compromised “out of an 
abundance of caution” (T. Frieden, personal communication, January 15, 
2014). The CDC made this initial recommendation based on a study 
done on rats by the Eastman Kodak Company in 1990 (Zwerdling, 
2014). But Lynn Goldman, the former director of the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s toxic chemical division, said there was not sufficient 
data to make a recommendation. A major issue with the study was 
that
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it looked only at how MCHM might affect adults, in this case by test-
ing it on grown rats. The researchers didn’t consider how the chemical 
might affect fetuses or newborns. . . . A lot of chemicals that don’t hurt 
adults can wreak havoc on the young. (Zwerdling, 2014)
This is the same issue experienced by officials making predictions 
about the flood levels for the Red River, who used the traditional 
measurement methods without accounting for the sensitivity to initial 
conditions. As Sellnow et al. (2002) stated, “the key problem associ-
ated with fractals in this case involved the communication of excessive 
confidence in a measurement system that lacked the precision needed” 
(p. 276). This was also the issue in West Virginia and was compounded 
by the fact that little was known about MCHM, as it had never been 
the culprit in a contamination event like this one. Because of the time 
constraints and the lack of any preexisting test to measure MCHM 
levels in drinking water, the teams charged with creating such a test 
made the mistake of relying on imprecise measures, which ultimately 
did more harm than good and exacerbated the uncertainty surrounding 
the situation.
Strange Attractors
Strange attractors are those things which “emphasize order and pattern 
within chaos. An attractor is an organizing principle such as a common 
set of values to which a system will return even as it moves through a 
bifurcation” (Freimuth, 2006, p. 145). For as much as a system is sen-
sitive to initial conditions and seemingly minuscule events can cause 
it to descend into chaos, it is also susceptible to the presence of those 
things that cause it to move out of bifurcation and toward a more or-
ganized and less chaotic state. Strange attractors can take many forms. 
However, in West Virginia, no immediately observable force provided 
the reassurance necessary for the affected stakeholders to move toward 
a sense of normalcy. Freedom Industries had closed its doors, and 
its officials refused to cooperate with the media or investigators and 
never offered an official apology. The West Virginia American Water 
Company was focused on shifting blame, constantly reminding stake-
holders that it was not the source of the spill and, therefore, was just 
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as much a victim of Freedom Industries as they were. While its lack of 
fault for the spill is true, the victims were looking for answers and help 
getting clean water, not more corporate blame shifting. As for the state 
government, it, too, failed to meet the needs of the people. In a notable 
and cringe-worthy press conference on January 12, 2014, Governor 
Earl Ray Tomblin fumbled and failed to provide satisfactory answers 
to questions about how the spill happened and what was being done 
to make it right (Vingiano, 2014). Again, an established organization 
that should have been prepared to handle the event more effectively 
proved to be incapable of doing so.
When Governor Tomblin and President Obama declared an emer-
gency at the state and federal level, respectively, the affected area was 
given access to special funds and services set aside for use in such a 
disaster. Immediately following these declarations, the National Guard 
arrived on-site with tanker trucks full of potable water and other sup-
plies. Additionally, FEMA was dispatched to the area. These organiza-
tions worked alongside local FEMA and Red Cross chapters to distribute 
water and provide necessary aid to the victims. According to a FEMA 
spokesperson, it provided approximately 7 million liters of water and 
130,000 meals during the initial response (Marks, 2014). When the 
water company began lifting the “do not use” ban and provided flushing 
instructions, this signaled the end of acute phase of the crisis. However, 
as was described previously, people found that even after following the 
flushing guidelines, the water still had the funny smell and taste that 
were present at the outset of the crisis. Therefore they continued to 
distrust the water and sought alternative sources for water. However, 
a new obstacle was now introduced, because the National Guard and 
other relief organizations had left the area. When the water company 
proclaimed the water to be safe again and the “do not use” order was 
lifted, so, too, were the emergency declarations put in place by Governor 
Tomblin and President Obama. Thus the state’s access to disaster relief 
funds and the reassuring presence of FEMA and the National Guard 
and their trucks full of bottled water had vanished. At this point, the 
chaotic system experienced another period of bifurcation, and the or-
ganizations that could have functioned as strange attractors and created 
points of self-organization were no longer present in the system. Those 
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affected found themselves with a set of unique needs precipitated by a 
crisis that those in power felt was no longer an issue.
Self-Organization
Self-organization is referred to as the anti-chaos mechanism. It is the 
antithesis of bifurcation. It is because of self-organization that a system 
in chaos does not remain in chaos indefinitely. One cannot discuss 
self-organization without discussing strange attractors. According to 
the literature, self-organization cannot happen without the presence of 
strange attractors in the system. Eventually, for the system to move out 
of bifurcation, the strange attractors present within the system must 
begin the self-organization process (Seeger, 2002). In West Virginia, 
the self-organization process happened in a unique way. Typically, 
established organizations express the values that represent strange at-
tractors. However, the established organizations in West Virginia failed 
to do this and therefore did not spur the self-organization process. To 
compensate for this, West Virginians self-organized in such a way as 
to represent these strange attractor values and become the catalyst 
for self-organization. While this sounds redundant, when one takes a 
closer look at the emergent organizations that formed in the wake of 
the crisis, it becomes clearer the role they played in moving the chaotic 
system away from bifurcation and toward self-organization.
Because affected stakeholders could not rely on the established 
organizations to do their part, nor could they rely on the reassuring 
presence of the relief organizations, they had to find alternate ways to 
respond and create order within the chaotic system. They did this by 
self-organizing into emergent organizations that performed a variety 
of relief functions and worked to meet the previously unmet needs of 
the affected stakeholders. They harnessed the power of social media 
and other information communication technologies to form quickly 
and coordinate efforts for maximum effectiveness. One of these groups, 
the WV Clean Water Hub (n.d.), created a Facebook page. The “About” 
section describes its purpose:
We have been coordinating deliveries of water and needed supplies 
through direct response to requests from community members as well 
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as establishing relationships with particular communities in need . . . 
and we are working with community leaders to see how we can help 
address the long-term needs of the community.
This is just one example of several groups that emerged in the 
wake of this crisis to fill a variety of unmet needs within the affected 
community. These groups, usually through the connective power of 
social media and information communication technologies, provided 
necessary information and instructions for self-protection, solicited 
donations of supplies, and disseminated supplies among victims. These 
activities were necessary for those affected not only to get the water 
they desperately needed but also to feel like there was a proverbial light 
at the end of the tunnel. These roles were no longer being filled by the 
relief organizations and were being ignored by the established organi-
zations; therefore the emergence and presence of these organizations 
was the driving force behind the self-organization process in the West 
Virginia water crisis.
Chaos theory has been applied to a number of different crisis events, 
and this case represents another instance where the tenets of chaos 
theory are present through the crisis life cycle. This application builds 
on the existing body of literature and extends it to a new crisis type. 
When the tank at Freedom Industries began leaking on the morning 
of January 9, 2014, it marked the first in a series of departures from the 
norm that would put this system into chaos and a point of bifurcation. 
Because the established organizations were largely unaware of these 
points of bifurcation, they failed to respond appropriately or effectively. 
On two occasions, a failure of perspective caused them to misread the 
fractal patterns and rely on imprecise measures. The first occasion was 
when the water company learned that its water uptake source had been 
contaminated but did not shut the system down because it felt the pu-
rification system would be sufficient to handle the contamination. This 
was later to prove to be an incorrect assumption. The second instance 
occurred when the CDC, working in conjunction with the National 
Guard and the water company, made an initial recommendation of 
one part per million as an appropriate threshold for MCHM in drink-
ing water. Further research proved this to be imprecise and incorrect. 
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Thus the CDC amended its recommendation to be one part per billion. 
However, the damage to its credibility was already done, and people 
continued to distrust the water and rely on alternate sources. This kept 
the system in bifurcation rather than moving it toward self-organization, 
which was contrary to the goals of the organizations.
Strange attractors are common values and points of organization to 
which a system in chaos is naturally drawn. The established organiza-
tions usually represent these values, and they provide stakeholders with 
a sense of order and the reassurance of an eventual return to normal. 
In West Virginia, the established organizations failed to represent these 
values and sense of order. Freedom Industries failed to cooperate and 
offer any helpful information or even a simple apology. The water com-
pany failed to acknowledge the lack of normal operating procedures 
and made several missteps that sent the system back into bifurcation. 
Though the National Guard and FEMA were able to provide relief for a 
short period of time, they left the system before order was restored and 
the crisis had ended. Because of these failings, it fell to the stakeholders 
to take on this role. Motivated by community ties and strong values, 
they self-organized into emergent groups and became the strange at-
tractors that spurred the system toward self-organization and away from 
bifurcation. They represented the strange attractor values and provided 
the much-needed sense of order. Because of this, they connected as 
strange attractors and precipitated self-organization.
Conclusion
Organizations that experience a crisis fit the model of a system in chaos. 
The body of literature cited herein shows its successful application to 
a number of different crisis events, from natural disasters to criminal 
activity (Freimuth, 2006; Horsley, 2014; Liska et al., 2012; Sellnow & 
Seeger, 2001). However, this case is the first application of chaos theory 
to an environmental contamination event of this nature and the first 
application to a water contamination crisis. Thus this work builds on the 
existing body of literature and applies the theory in a new context. This 
case also highlights a situation in which a system did not “right itself ” 
through modes of self-organization seen in previous cases but rather 
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required the intervention of important stakeholder groups to spur that 
process. This case could serve as an example to others experiencing a 
crisis who feel that established organizations are not doing their part to 
move the system from bifurcation to self-organization. The actions of 
the West Virginia residents provide a good model for others to follow 
if they find themselves in a similar situation, as the citizens of Flint, 
Michigan, did. Their water was contaminated not by an accidental spill 
but rather due to negligence in the water treatment process, allowing 
the water to be contaminated with high levels of lead. As this case drew 
more media attention, citizen groups formed in response to the crisis, 
and several groups in West Virginia have posted messages of solidarity 
on social media. This is one example, but it demonstrates the potential 
for stakeholders in the midst of a chaotic system to become participants 
in the self-healing process.
In the same vein, for relief organizations and those called to respond 
to a crisis, this case shows the willingness of certain stakeholders to be 
involved in their own recovery process. It could be beneficial for all to 
expand their view of the affected population from simply being “victims” 
who require service and aid to realize that some could be willing to be 
active participants in the response. Having additional hands on deck to 
help with the many tasks necessitated by a crisis is helpful, but the local 
knowledge and connections that these people bring to the table can 
prove invaluable to those coming from the outside to provide assistance.
From the moment the hole developed in the bottom of the tank at 
Freedom Industries, a chain of events and points of bifurcation began 
that set the system into chaos. When the water company issued the 
“do not use” ban to its 300,000 customers, it created a large amount of 
uncertainty and fear for those individuals. Given that most, if not all, 
had not experienced a water ban of this magnitude before, they most 
likely experienced a collapse in sense making. Weick (1993) referred to 
this as a cosmology episode, because people experience the feeling of 
having never been in that situation before and having no idea where 
to turn for answers.
Fractals allow the observer to see the overlying patterns in an oth-
erwise chaotic and disordered system. However, observing the pattern 
is difficult if one relies on an imprecise measurement system. This was 
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the case in West Virginia on two occasions. First, the water company 
failed to issue the “do not use” ban immediately after learning of the 
contamination because it assumed the filtration system would take care 
of the problem. However, this failed to realize the absence of normal 
operating conditions due to the system experiencing bifurcation. The 
second failure occurred when the team charged with creating an ac-
ceptable recommended threshold for MCHM in drinking water made 
an initial recommendation of one part per million. The team quickly 
retracted this recommendation when they realized it did not take into 
account the safety of pregnant women, small children, and the elderly. 
After adopting a more precise measurement tool, they made a new 
recommendation of one part per billion.
Strange attractors and self-organization go hand in hand in a chaotic 
system. Strange attractors are those things present within the system 
that spur the self-organization (anti-chaos) process. In previous studies, 
strange attractor values have been expressed by official relief organiza-
tions, such as FEMA and the National Guard or a top law enforcement 
official (Horsley, 2014; Sellnow et al., 2002). In West Virginia, the es-
tablished relief organizations and top officials who should have led the 
response and functioned as strange attractors failed to perform their 
duties effectively. Therefore the system had to create other strange 
attractors to pull itself out of chaos. This process occurred through 
self-organization among the concerned citizens and victims themselves.
Future Directions
The application of chaos theory to organizations in crisis is a budding 
area of research that calls for more widespread use and careful obser-
vation. Particularly, this study calls for more exploration of the self-
organization component of chaos theory and how crisis communication 
messages can help or hinder that process. Observing messages that are 
successful at meeting the informational needs of stakeholders and how 
they can move the system away from bifurcation can strengthen the 
link between effective communication and self-organization.
The MCHM contamination of the Elk River created a crisis for the 
300,000 affected residents whose health and well-being were threatened 
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and daily routines were upended by this event. The unique character-
istics of the event made it ideal for studying from a crisis communica-
tion and chaos theory perspective. This in-depth case study adds to 
the growing body of crisis communication literature using chaos as a 
theoretical lens, and it is the first to focus on a crisis in the form of a 
water contamination. This study also contributes to the literature by 
closely examining how a chaotic system moves from bifurcation toward 
self-organization when established organizations fail to exhibit the 
values of strange attractors.
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